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THE MORE, THE MARRY-ER? THE FUTURE OF
POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE IN THE WAKE OF OBERGEFELL V.
HODGES
Amberly N. Beye*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since this nation’s inception, the United States Supreme Court
has grappled with conceptualizing marriage in a way that reflects both
this nation’s values and this nation’s Constitution. Conceptualizing
marriage in a concordant way has proven to be a time-intensive task,
leading the Supreme Court to analyze a variety of factual scenarios to
determine which relationships fall within the protective confines of the
Constitution. Over time, the Court’s perception of marriage has
adapted to changing societal norms, encompassing issues such as race,1
poverty,2 and criminality.3 The limits of such adaptation were tested in
recent years, when courts were faced with the constitutionality of samesex marriage.
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of same-sex
marriage and the related fundamental right to marry in Obergefell v.
Hodges.4 In Obergefell, a class of homosexual plaintiffs claimed that their
constitutional rights were violated when they were denied the right to
marry their same-sex partner.5 Ultimately, on June 26, 2015, the
Supreme Court ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor and held that a
fundamental right to marry protects marriages between same-sex
couples.6
In the wake of Obergefell, one of the main criticisms of the majority
opinion is that it will reduce governmental restriction of marriage,
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude,
2013, Drew University. I would like to express my gratitude to my faculty advisor,
Solangel Maldonado, for her guidance and support in the writing of this Comment. I
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1
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
3
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
4
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015).
5
Id. at 2593.
6
Id. at 2607.
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thereby opening the floodgates to marriages of all sorts. For example,
some have questioned whether the fundamental right to marry
recognized by Obergefell also includes the right to marry multiple
people.7 Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Obergefell questions the
viability of a definition of marriage that is limited to those unions
between two people. In his view, the majority calls this definition and
its limit into question.8 He also suggests that an extension of the
fundamental right to marry to polygamous marriages may be even
more natural than an extension of the right to same-sex marriages,
since polygamous marriages are more deeply steeped in some global
cultural traditions.9
Similarly, a New York Times op-ed piece by William Baude,
published soon after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Obergefell, questioned the validity and power of a two-person limit.10
Like Chief Justice Roberts, Baude argued that the jump from same-sex
marriage to plural marriage is not a large one, especially since the
majority’s opinion focused primarily on a “fundamental right to
marry,” rather than the narrow issue of sexual orientation.11 Baude
explains that the “fundamental right to marry” is more loosely defined,
and is characterized by concepts such as autonomy, personal
fulfillment, child rearing, and social order.12 This broad judicial
conceptualization of marriage may therefore include and protect
7

There are three types of plural marriage, or what is more colloquially referred
to as “polygamy”: (1) polygyny, the most common type, in which one man is married
to two or more wives; (2) polyandry, in which one woman is married to two or more
husbands; and (3) polygynandry, a group marriage in which two or more wives are
simultaneously married to two or more husbands. Alean Al-Krenawi & Vered SlonimNevo, Psychosocial and Familial Functioning of Children from Polygynous and Monogamous
Families, 148 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 745, 745 (2008). In accordance with both statistics and
relevant literature, this Comment will use the term “polygamy” interchangeably with
“polygyny.” See Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588,
para. 136 (Can.) (“Over the course of human history, polygyny has been the only form
of polygamy practiced on a significant basis. Polyandry has been exceedingly rare and
has tended to be a temporary adaptation to environmental stresses or other ecological
factors.”).
8
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted)
(“One immediate question invited by the majority’s position is whether the States may
retain the definition of marriage as a union of two people. Although the majority
randomly inserts the adjective ‘two’ in various places, it offers no reason at all why the
two-person element of the core definition of marriage may be preserved while the
man-woman elements may not.”).
9
Id.
10
William Baude, Is Polygamy Next?, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/opinion/is-polygamy-next.html?_r=0.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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“groups of adults who have profound polyamorous attachments and
wish to build families and join the community.”13
This Comment examines the fundamental right to marry and
analyze whether Obergefell compels the recognition of plural marriages.
Part II of this Comment will briefly summarize the Supreme Court’s
rulings on the fundamental right to marry and the closely associated
right to privacy. This Part highlights the Court’s different (and at
times, disparate) approaches in cases dealing with a fundamental right
to marry. Part III will then discuss the fundamental right to marry in
the wake of Obergefell. Here, the main question is whether the Court
would recognize the right to marry multiple people as a fundamental
right. Because it is not clear what standard or test(s) the Court would
apply, Part III will discuss and analyze three possible approaches. Part
III will ultimately argue that the fundamentality of the right to marry
multiple people will probably depend on the mode of the Court’s
analysis. Part IV argues that even if the Court was to find that the
fundamental right to marry includes a right to plural marriage, laws
prohibiting polygamous marriage may not withstand constitutional
scrutiny because such marriages pose a significant risk to the welfare
of women and children. Finally, Part V will conclude that, in the wake
of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell, a future
ruling as to the constitutionality of polygamous marriage will largely
depend on the standard of scrutiny the Court applies.
II. THE FOUNDATIONAL CASES
A. The History of the Fundamental Right to Marry
As early as 1888, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
marriage “creat[es] the most important relation in life.” 14 Underscoring
this sentiment, marriage has been epitomized as “the foundation of
the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress.”15 Thus, the fundamentality of marriage was
recognized, separate from Due Process Clause issues.16 Over the next
13

Id.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (emphasis added).
15
Id. at 211. See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”).
16
This Comment will look at polygamous marriage through the lens of substantive
due process. There are two types of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims:
procedural and substantive. Procedural due process claims ensure that proper court
procedures are followed before an individual’s right to life, liberty, or property is taken
away. See Aaron J. Shuler, From Immutable to Existential: Protecting Who We Are and Who
We Want to Be with the “Equalerty” of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J.L. & SOC.
14
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seventy-nine years, the Court came to recognize the right to marry as a
fundamental part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause,17
but marriage was not considered a separate “fundamental right.”
In 1967, the Supreme Court recognized a fundamental “freedom
to marry.”18 In Loving v. Virginia, a couple alleged that their
constitutional rights had been violated when they were indicted on
charges of violating the state’s ban on interracial marriage.19 The
Court reversed the indictment, applied strict scrutiny,20 recognized a
fundamental right to marry, and held that the fundamental right to
marry included the right to marry a person of a different race.21
Over time, the Supreme Court held that the fundamental right to
marry protected couples from different economic backgrounds,
thereby reaffirming the fundamental right to marry. For example, in
Zablocki v. Redhail,22 a group of Wisconsin residents challenged the
constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that prohibited parents behind

CHALLENGES 220, 223 (2010). Comparatively, substantive due process is a doctrine that
has evolved to protect rights not explicitly enumerated in the constitution. Id.
Substantive due process is commonly accepted to encompass fundamental, or
something akin to fundamental, rights. See id. at 224.
17
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
18
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
19
Id. at 2–3.
20
Strict scrutiny is a standard of review courts use when reviewing cases.
Specifically, strict scrutiny is used to determine whether restrictions of a fundamental
right are constitutional. “When a statutory classification significantly interferes with
the exercise of a fundamental right,” strict scrutiny says “it cannot be upheld unless it
is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate
only those interests.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). However, strict
scrutiny is not the only judicial standard of review available. Traditionally, if a right is
not deemed “fundamental,” the court may apply a more deferential standard of review
known as “rational basis review.” Rational basis review requires that “an impartial
lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public
purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class.” City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Given that rational basis review is more deferential toward lawmakers, and since it
doesn’t require that the law at issue be the only means possible of achieving the goal,
it is a much easier standard to meet.
21
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (internal citations omitted) (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic
civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival. To deny this
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications
embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of
equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s
citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not to marry, a
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State.”).
22
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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on child support from legally marrying.23 Applying strict scrutiny, the
Court held for the plaintiffs, reaffirming that there is a fundamental
right to marry, and extending the holding in Loving to the facts in
Zablocki.24 Here, the Court suggested that it would be antithetical to
recognize a right to privacy, while permitting such restrictions on the
right to marry.25 Notably, however, the Court stated that recognition
of a fundamental right to marry does not mean that there cannot be
any state regulation of marriage. Instead, the Court clarified that the
State may regulate decisions and acts associated with marriage, so long
as these regulations “do not significantly interfere with decisions to
enter into the marital relationship.”26
The fundamental right to marry was further strengthened and
institutionalized by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Turner v. Safley.27 In this case, the Court considered whether the
constitutionally protected right to marry applies to prison inmates.
The Court held that it does, but it applied a lower standard of review.28
Rather than strict scrutiny, which requires narrow tailoring, the Court
in Turner applied the more deferential rational basis review, since this
case dealt with prison inmates.29 Accordingly, the regulation needed
only to be “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”30
Despite the different standard of review, this case is yet another
example of the Court’s extension of the fundamental right to marry.
B. The Fundamental Right to Marry Someone of the Same Sex
While the United States Supreme Court recognized a
fundamental right to marry, this did not mean that all individuals
could exercise this right, free from government restriction. Notably,
same-sex couples remained outside the right’s protective confines.
However, the arena of same-sex constitutional issues was not without
23

The statute would not allow parents with child support obligations to obtain a
marriage license until they submitted proof of compliance with the obligations, and
demonstrated that the children “are not then and are not likely thereafter to become
public charges.” WIS. STAT. §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) (1973) (repealed 1977).
24
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384 (“Although Loving arose in the context of racial
discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to
marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”).
25
Id. at 386 (“[I]t would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with
respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the
relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.”).
26
Id.
27
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
28
Id. at 89.
29
Id.
30
Id.
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judicial reform. Years after the fundamental right to marry was
extended to heterosexual interracial couples, debtor parents, and
incarcerated persons, a related right was recognized and extended to
homosexual couples in Lawrence v. Texas.31
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court was confronted with a challenge
to the Texas Penal Code, Section 21.06(a), which criminalized sodomy
between two individuals of the same sex. Without identifying their
specific standard of review,32 the Court ultimately held that such an
“intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual” was
constitutionally unjustifiable.33 In doing so, this case extended Due
Process Clause protection to same-sex relationships in an
unprecedented way.34
Then, a decade after Lawrence, United States v. Windsor35 challenged
the constitutionality of section three of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), which denied federal recognition to same-sex marriages
validly performed under state law.36 In its opinion, the Supreme Court
did not specify a particular standard of review37 or explicitly mention
31

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Though the Court did not announce a particular standard of review, it did use
language that suggested it was applying rational basis review. See id. at 578 (emphasis
added) (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”).
33
Id. at 578.
34
Id. at 567 (“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice.”).
35
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
36
The Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C.S. §7 (1996), invalidated by United States
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
37
Though the court did not specify which standard of review it was applying, some
of the majority opinion’s language was reminiscent of rational basis review. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. at 2696 (emphasis added) (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”). However,
the Court’s opinion seemed to hold the Defense of Marriage Act to a higher standard
than rational basis. See id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As nearly as I can tell, the
Court . . . [in] its opinion does not apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions
are taken from rational-basis cases . . . . [T]he Court certainly does not apply anything
that resembles that deferential framework.”). See also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In its words and its deed, Windsor
established a level of scrutiny for classifications based on sexual orientation that is
unquestionably higher than rational basis review. In other words, Windsor requires
that heightened scrutiny be applied to equal protection claims involving sexual
orientation.”); Robert C. Farrell, Justice Kennedy’s Idiosyncratic Understanding of Equal
Protection and Due Process, and Its Costs, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 439, 481–84 (2014); Jack
Harrison, On Marriage and Polygamy, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 89, 130 (2015) (“Justice
Kennedy’s language and analysis combined with the ultimate determination of the
Court that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional, indicates that some elevated level
of scrutiny was employed.”); Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Note, Reconciling Rational32
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“substantive due process.”38 Nevertheless, the Court held that section
three of DOMA was unconstitutional. In so holding, the Court left
section two of DOMA untouched, “allow[ing] states to refuse to
recognize same-sex marriage performed under the laws of other
states.”39 Thus, Windsor did not result in blanket acceptance of samesex marriage.40
Two years later, in Obergefell, the Court finally extended the
fundamental right to marry to homosexual couples.41 In Obergefell, as
in Lawrence and Windsor, the Court did not expressly state the standard
of review it applied. In fact, the Court seemed to ignore the
preexisting analytical framework that had been established for
substantive due process claims.42 Instead, the Court identified four
“principles and traditions” that demonstrated why marriage is a
fundamental, constitutional right.43 After analyzing these four
“principles and traditions,” the Court found that they applied equally
to heterosexual and homosexual unions.44 As a result, the Court
extended the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples.45
C. Why Do These Cases Matter?
There are several lessons to be learned from the preceding review
of Supreme Court precedent. First, there is a fundamental right to
Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2116 (2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“The Court did not explicitly state what level of
scrutiny it applied in reviewing [the Defense of Marriage Act]. However, the Court’s
opinion d[id] not apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions [we]re taken from
rational-basis cases such as Moreno and Romer. Therefore, Windsor fits within the
tradition of rational basis with bite.”).
38
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The majority never utters
the dreaded words ‘substantive due process,’ perhaps sensing the disrepute into which
that doctrine has fallen.”).
39
Id. at 2682–83.
40
Id. at 2696–97 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
41
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (emphasis added) (“[T]he
right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples
of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
42
Id. at 2602 (“Glucksberg did insist that liberty under the Due Process Clause must
be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific
historical practices. Yet while that approach may have been appropriate for the
asserted right there involved (physician assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the
approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, including
marriage and intimacy.”). See also id. at 2621 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (noting that “the
majority’s position requires it to effectively overrule Glucksberg”).
43
Id. at 2589–90; see also infra Part III.C.
44
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015).
45
Id. at 2604.
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marry that has been upheld and protected by the Court since 1967.46
Additionally, the Court has viewed the fundamental right to marry as
However, despite expansion of the
an ever-changing right.47
fundamental right to marry, that right has only been extended to
couples.48
Furthermore, the preceding review shows that the Supreme
Court’s treatment of the fundamental right to marry has been both
extensive and complex.
The Court has repeatedly upheld a
fundamental right to marry, and a concurrent, yet separate,
fundamental right to privacy.49 These holdings have been based on a
variety of factors and tests.50 At times, the Court has completely avoided
any language reminiscent of a standard of review, and when a specific
method has been employed (either implicitly or explicitly), it has
ranged from rational basis review51 to strict scrutiny.52 Thus, when
dealing with the fundamental right to marry, the Court’s methodology
remains relatively undefined.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PLURAL MARRIAGE
As demonstrated in Part II, the United States Supreme Court has
yet to embrace a uniform framework for analyzing the fundamental
right to marry. Because of the variety of methods and tests used in
previous cases, it is difficult to predict how the Court will analyze the
right to plural marriage. In most substantive due process cases, the
Court uses a two-step inquiry. Step one asks whether the right at issue
is “fundamental.” Generally, the Court applies strict scrutiny to
46

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (“[C]hanged understandings of marriage
are characteristic of a nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to
new generations, often through perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and then
are considered in the political sphere and the judicial process.”).
48
See, e.g., id. at 2607 (emphasis added) (“same-sex couples may exercise the right
to marry in all states”).
49
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (stating, on the topic
of marriage: “We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions”). See also Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (noting that the fundamental right to privacy “has
some extension to activities relating to marriage”).
50
See infra Part II.
51
See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
52
See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
47
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“fundamental” rights and rational basis review to non-fundamental
rights.53 Thus, the fundamentality of a right to plural marriage can be
determinative since a judicially recognized fundamental right is
protected by the Constitution and cannot be impinged upon by state
law.54
Since Loving, the Court has struck down state laws that have
infringed upon the fundamental right to marry.55 Most recently, in
Obergefell, the Court extended the fundamental right to marry to samesex, monogamous couples. However, a two-person limit is evident at
various points throughout Obergefell.56 Thus, while the Court expanded
the fundamental right to marry, it did not diverge from the
monogamous model it has retained as a defining element of this right.
By definition, plural marriage does not fall within the traditionally
protected, monogamous, marital model. As a result, the right to marry
multiple people cannot be inferred from Obergefell, and would require
an individualized inquiry. Post-Obergefell, the Supreme Court could
adopt one of three approaches to analyze challenges to restrictions on
plural marriage.
This Part will strive to determine whether the right to plural
marriage is “fundamental.” Since the Court has not adopted a uniform
approach, this Part will view the potential fundamentality of plural
marriage through three different lenses: the Glucksberg approach, the
flexible approach, and the Obergefell four-part test. As this Part will
show, the Court’s methodology will largely dictate how it will address
challenges to restrictions on polygamous marriage.
53

See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (noting that “‘due process of
law’ . . . forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at
all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest”).
54
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“[A]ll fundamental rights comprised within the term
liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the states.”).
55
See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. 78; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
56
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (emphasis added) (“The
four principles and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that the reasons marriage
is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same sex couples.”);
id. (emphasis added) (“The right to marry is fundamental because it supports a twoperson union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”); id.
(emphasis added) (“The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two
persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and
spirituality.”); id. at 2601 (emphasis added) (“[J]ust as a couple vows to support each
other, so does society pledge to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and
material benefits to protect and nourish the union.”); id. at 2602 (emphasis added)
(“The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the
Fourteenth amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the
equal protection of the laws.”).
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A. Approach 1: The Glucksberg Approach
In Washington v. Glucksberg,57 the Supreme Court enumerated a
two-factor approach to be used when determining whether a right is
fundamental. First, the asserted right must be described narrowly, so
as to include only the specific interests at stake.58 Second, the right
needs to be “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.”59
In Glucksberg, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ loosely-defined
“liberty to shape death,”60 replacing it with a narrower “right to commit
suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”61 By
defining the contested right narrowly, the Court placed it outside the
protective confines of the Constitution. Thus, judicial framing can
determine whether or not a contested right is “fundamental.”
Post-Obergefell, the Court may adopt the Glucksberg approach to
decide if restrictions on polygamous marriage are constitutional. In
accordance with step one, it is likely that the Court will view restrictions
on polygamous marriage in light of a narrow “right to marry multiple
people,” rather than the broader, deeply rooted, fundamental “right to
marry.” Then, in step two, the Court will ask if the right to marry
multiple people is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.”62
57

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). The plaintiffs argued that the
State’s ban on physician-assisted suicide was an unconstitutional violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 708. The Court determined that there was not a
fundamental right at issue, and applied rational basis review. Id. at 728. After applying
rational basis review, the Court held that the ban on physician-assisted suicide was
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, and was therefore
constitutional. Id.
58
Id. at 720–21.
59
Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)) (stating
that fundamental rights and liberties that are afforded constitutional protection are
those that are, from an objective perspective, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition”). But cf. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2602 (“Glucksberg did insist that liberty
under the Due Process Clause must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with
central reference to specific historical practices. Yet while that approach may have
been appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted suicide), it is
inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental
rights, including marriage and intimacy.”). Because of this apparent incongruity, and
Obergefell’s explicit repudiation of the Glucksberg framework, it is unlikely that the Court
would ask whether or not the right to plural marriage is deeply rooted. However, since
this possibility is seemingly, but not completely or explicitly, banned in the case of
polygamous marriage, this Comment will walk through the legal analysis that would
ordinarily be required.
60
Id. at 722.
61
Id. at 723.
62
Id.
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In regard to the second step, polygamy has been prohibited
throughout Western societies for more than 1750 years. 63 In America,
polygamy has always been viewed as an “offence against society,
cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less
severity.”64 In fact, when states first joined the Union, they prohibited
polygamy either by their own statute, derived from English common
law, or by virtue of territorial prohibitions.65 Although members of
some religions had customarily engaged in plural marriages prior to
the Nation’s founding, neither states66 nor individuals67 were granted
immunity from the prohibition of polygamous marriage. Today,
polygamous marriage remains a criminal offense, prohibited by penal
statutes across the country.68 Thus, under the Glucksberg approach, the
Supreme Court would probably deny that polygamy is deeply rooted,
and would therefore likely hold that there is not a fundamental right
to polygamous marriage.
B. Approach 2: The Flexible Approach
Earlier, Part II demonstrated that the United States Supreme
Court has recognized an ever-evolving fundamental right to marry.69
Over time, the Court has adopted a relatively flexible analysis to allow
for the evolution of this right. Instead of carving out custom-tailored

63

See, e.g., Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588,
para. 229 (Can.) (“[F]or more than 1750 years the Western legal tradition has . . .
declared polygamy to be an offence. The denunciation of the practice has been based
on natural, philosophical, political, sociological, psychological and scientific
arguments.”). See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) (“At common
law, the second marriage was always void (2 Kent, Com. 79), and from the earliest
history of England polygamy has been treated as an ofence [sic.] against society.”).
64
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.
65
Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1197 (D. Utah 2013).
66
Utah was required to ban polygamous marriage in order to be accepted into
the union. See Casey E. Faucon, Marriage Outlaws: Regulating Polygamy in America, 22
DUKE J. GEND. L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (2014) (“The Utah Constitution of 1896 permanently
banned the practice [of polygamy], allowing Utah to attain statehood in 1896.”). See
also UTAH CONST. art. XXIV, § 2.
67
See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (“[A]s a law of the organization of society under the
exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not
be allowed.”).
68
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.15 (Consol. 2016) (“A person is guilty of bigamy
when he contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another person at a time
when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Bigamy is a class
E felony.”). See also State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 741–45 (Utah 2006).
69
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (emphasis added)
(“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
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rights for non-traditional couples (e.g. a right to marry someone of a
different race,70 or a right to marry someone of the same sex71), the
Court adopted a more broad-based approach, including many nontraditional couples under the broader umbrella of the fundamental
right to marry.72
The main difference between the second approach and the first
approach is the way in which the right is defined. Under Approach 1,
the Glucksberg approach, the right at issue is narrowly defined.73 Under
Approach 2, the flexible approach, the right at issue is broadly defined.
The breadth of the second approach extends the protections
associated with the fundamental right to marry to a greater number of
couples.
Members of the Court have struggled with these two approaches
and have expressed different preferences.74 Thus far, no approach has
triumphed. Since members of the Court have adopted both
approaches,75 it is difficult to predict which would be favored in future
cases. Furthermore, the differences in these approaches could yield
two different views on the constitutionality of the prohibition of
polygamous marriage.
The United States Supreme Court seems to have adopted the
second approach, or something akin to it, in many landmark cases
70

See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
72
This broad-based approach is similar to the Court’s approach in Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Lawrence, the Court analyzed the Texas statute under
the broad umbrella of “liberty,” instead of a more myopic right, the right to engage in
homosexual sodomy. Id. at 562.
73
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (“[A] right to
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so”).
74
Some justices have embraced the first approach, narrowly defining the right at
issue. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (emphasis added)
(stating that the court “refer[s] to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”). However,
there is not a uniform approach, either between or within cases. See, e.g., id. at 132
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (disagreeing with the majority and
citing cases, including Loving and Turner, to point out that “[o]n occasion the Court
has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality
that might not be ‘the most specific level’ available”). See also Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (citations omitted) (“Appropriate limits on
substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful
respect for the teachings of history and solid recognition of the basic values that
underlie our society.”). But see id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting) (“What the deeply
rooted traditions of the country are is arguable.”).
75
Compare Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705 (“[A] right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so.”), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“The instant
case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent
dimensions.”).
71
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dealing with the fundamental right to marry.76 Under this approach,
the Court has viewed the borders of the fundamental right to marry as
relatively malleable.
Resultantly, the Court has extended the
protections associated with the fundamental right to marry to
interracial couples,77 inmates,78 and parents who have not paid child
support.79
It is feasible that the Court could use this flexible approach if
asked to analyze the constitutionality of restrictions on plural marriage.
Use of this approach would likely entail analysis under the broader
umbrella of the fundamental right to marry, eliminating the need for
a separate analysis of the “right to marry multiple people.” Since the
fundamental right to marry is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition,” the Court would probably conclude that the
fundamental right to marry encompasses a right to plural marriage.
C. Approach 3: The Obergefell Four-Part Test
In Obergefell, the United States Supreme Court adopted a third
approach, a four-part test. Using this approach, the Court compared
same-sex marriage to marriage more generally, and considered
whether the “principles and traditions [that] demonstrate the reasons
marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal
force”80 to those in same-sex marriages. Ultimately, the Court held that
each of the four principles and traditions applied equally.81
Under this approach, the Court may try to envelop polygamous
marriage in the cloak of the fundamental right to marry. To do so, the
Court would need to determine whether the “principles and traditions
[that] demonstrate the reasons marriage is fundamental under the
Constitution apply with equal force”82 to those in polygamous
marriages. The four “principles and traditions” include (1) “individual
autonomy,”83 (2) the importance of the “two-person union,”84 (3) the
76

See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (“Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial
marriage’; Turner did not ask about a ‘right of inmates to marry’; and Zablocki did not
ask about a ‘right of father with unpaid child support duties to marry.’ Rather, each
case inquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was
a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.”).
77
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
78
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
79
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
80
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589.
81
Id. at 2589.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
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rights of “childrearing, procreation, and education,”85 and (4) “social
order.”86
First, the Court would need to determine whether the right to
marry multiple people implicates “individual autonomy.”87 Generally,
an individual’s decisions regarding marriage have profound
implications for many aspects of one’s freedom.88 Arguably, there is
nothing that would distinguish the choice to enter into a polygamous
marriage from the choice to enter into a monogamous marriage. At
their core, both decisions involve the decision to marry, and the
Court’s analysis in Obergefell emphasized this unifying principle.89
Because of this broad scope, it is conceivable that the Court could find
that this factor also applies to polygamous marriages.
Second, the Court found “that the right to marry is fundamental
because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals.”90 Applying this finding to
same-sex marriages, the Court held that protection given to the
intimate relationship between two married individuals does not vary
based on sexual orientation.91 Rather, the Court’s analysis of this factor
seemed to turn on the intimate relationship between married
individuals and the constitutional protections afforded to that
relationship.92 Superficially, this logic seems to apply to those in
polygamous marriages. However, the Obergefell Court specifically
quantified the union as being between two individuals.93 Consequently,
in future cases the Court may either: (1) decide to focus on the “union”
aspect of this factor, and the importance of protecting the intimate
relationship between married individuals;94 or (2) choose to preserve
the “two-person” limit spelled out in Obergefell. If the Court takes the
second approach, polygamous marriage would be seen as conflicting
with the traditional, constitutionally protected right to marry.
85

Id. at 2590.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590.
87
Id. at 2589.
88
For example, expression, intimacy, and sexuality. Id. at 2590.
89
Id. at 2589 (citations omitted) (“Decisions about marriage are the most intimate
that an individual can make. This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual
orientation.”).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 2600.
92
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
93
Id. at 2599 (emphasis added) (“two-person union unlike any other”).
94
Id. at 2600 (“Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might
call out only to find no one there. It offers the hope of companionship and
understanding and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care
for the other.”).
86
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Third, the Court said same-sex marriage should be protected
because it “safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning
from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”95
This factor may be the most challenging for plural marriage advocates
to overcome because many studies have shown that polygamous
marriage poses a harm to women and children.96 For this reason, it is
likely that the Court would distinguish polygamous marriages from
monogamous marriages.
Lastly, the Court emphasized that marriage is important to our
nation because it is “the keystone of our social order.”97 Like same-sex
marriage, polygamous marriage is not deeply rooted in our nation’s
legal tradition. However, in Obergefell, the court focused on the
traditional, generalized, importance of “marriage,” rather than “samesex marriage” specifically.98 Here, the Court observed that marriage is
a key part of many legal and social rights.99 By denying same-sex
couples the right to marry, states were also barring them from
accessing these legal and social rights.100 Similarly, those in plural
marriages are denied access to the legal and social rights that are
reserved to married couples. For this reason, polygamous marriage is
akin to same-sex marriage, pre-Obergefell. Since the Obergefell Court
recognized the importance of making such rights available to all
married individuals, this factor would probably weigh in favor of
protecting those in plural marriages.
In sum, factors one and four seem to favor protecting individuals
in plural marriages. However, factors two and three present some
hurdles for plural marriage advocates. Given the novelty of this test,
future use and analysis of these factors is yet to be determined.
Resultantly, an analysis using these factors could either favor or
disfavor plural marriage.
D. Is There a Fundamental Right to Plural Marriage?
In the wake of Obergefell, it is unclear whether the Court would
recognize a fundamental right to a plural marriage. If faced with the
constitutionality of restrictions on plural marriage, there are three
95

Id.
See infra Part IV. Note that, though there is a large body of evidence suggesting
that polygamous marriage can and does significantly harm women and children, the
evidence is not conclusive.
97
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
98
Id. (“There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with
respect to this principle.”).
99
Id. at 2601.
100
Id.
96
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main approaches the Court may take. If the Court uses the “deeplyrooted” approach it would probably hold against protecting those in
plural marriages. However, if the Court adopts the flexible approach,
plural marriages may be protected as a subpart of the more general
fundamental right to marry. The Court’s analysis of polygamous
marriage under the Obergefell four-part test is less clear. Unlike the
Glucksberg approach or the flexible approach, this third approach
could weigh for or against legal recognition of polygamous marriages.
As analysis of these three approaches shows, the United States
Supreme Court could recognize a fundamental right to plural
marriage. If it did so, it would likely be under the guise of the more
general, fundamental right to marry.101 However, this would not be the
end of the conversation—the Court would then need to look at the
means and ends of the legislation at issue, as well as any alternative
options.
IV. EVEN IF THE RIGHT TO PLURAL MARRIAGE IS FUNDAMENTAL, CAN IT
SURVIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW?
There are two steps to determining whether a particular piece of
legislation is constitutional under a substantive due process analysis.
First, the Court must determine whether there is a fundamental right
at issue. Part III demonstrated that plural marriage may be viewed as
a fundamental right. Since it is possible that the Court may view plural
marriage as a fundamental right,102 Part IV will examine the second
question—whether anti-polygamy legislation can survive judicial
review.
Traditionally, the applicable level of scrutiny depends on whether
the right is “fundamental.” Generally, strict scrutiny has been applied
to cases where a fundamental right has been identified.103 Under “strict
scrutiny,” the government action must be narrowly tailored to promote
a compelling state interest.104 Thus, strict scrutiny requires a two-part
analysis: (1) whether the state has a compelling interest in limiting the
101

In Obergefell, the Court clearly said that it was going to look at marriage in
general, instead of as an amalgamation of separate rights. Id. at 2602.
102
As Part III shows, the Court may view plural marriage as either “the right to
marry multiple people,” or as part of the broader-based “right to marry.” See infra Part
III.
103
See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
104
See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (“When a statutory classification significantly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate
only those interests.”). See supra note 20.
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fundamental right, and (2) whether the state action is narrowly tailored
to furthering that compelling interest.
The State has a compelling interest in prohibiting plural marriage
because of the danger it poses to women and children.105 Some studies
have shown polygamous marriage to harm women and children both
in terms of their physical wellbeing (e.g. by abuse and increased health
risks106), and in terms of their emotional wellbeing.107 The fact that
plural marriage poses this danger to women and children
differentiates it from same-sex marriage.108 Though there are studies
to the contrary,109 the potential for such substantial harm may allow the
State to lawfully restrict plural marriage.110
A. Harm to Women
Women are harmed by polygamous marriage, and the State has a
compelling interest in prohibiting this harm. Most prominently,
polygamy violates norms of gender equality111 since it is a “deeply
105

See Richard A. Vazquez, Note, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of
Religion or Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 225, 239–40 (2001) (“The courts have an
interest in protecting women and children from the strikingly real crimes committed
in polygamous communities.”).
106
Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588, para.
8 (Can.) (noting that women in polygamous marriages “are more likely to die in
childbirth and live shorter lives than their monogamous counterparts”).
107
See Salman Elbedour et al., The Effect of Polygamous Marital Structure of Behavioral,
Emotional, and Academic Adjustment in Children: A Comprehensive Review of the Literature, 5
CLINICAL CHILD AND FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 255, 259 (2002) (“[T]he stress of polygamous
family life predisposes mothers and children to psychological problems.”).
108
Nicholas Bala, Why Canada’s Prohibition of Polygamy is Constitutionally Valid and
Sound Social Policy, 25 CAN. J. FAM. L. 165, 169 (2009) (“Unlike the recognition of samesex marriage, which promoted equality, protected the interests of children and saved
government resources, the recognition of polygamy would promote inequality, impose
costs on society, and harm children.”). See also id. at 177 (polygamy “raises very
different social and constitutional issues from the recognition of same-sex marriage”).
109
But see Angela Campbell, Bountiful Voices, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 183 (2009)
(drawing on interviews with women in a Canadian polygamous community, Campbell
presents a counter-narrative, arguing that polygamy is not always as harmful as it is
made out to be); Emily Duncan, The Positive Effects of Legalizing Polygamy: “Love is a Many
Splendored Thing,” 15 DUKE J. GEND. L. & POL’Y 315, 332 (2008) (arguing that “legalizing
polygamy would positively affect polygynist women and children” and that
“[c]ondemning every practicing polygynist to prevent the abuses of some may be
counterintuitive”).
110
See State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 744 (Utah 2006) (“[M]artial relationships serve
as the building blocks of our society. The State must be able to assert some level of
control over those relationships to ensure the smooth operation of laws and further
the proliferation of social unions our society deems beneficial while discouraging
those deemed harmful.”).
111
See Bala, supra note 108, at 182 (“[T]he social reality today is that polygyny is the
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patriarchal institution.”112 Though, in theory, plural marriage can be
between a woman and multiple men, in the overwhelming majority of
cases plural marriage takes the form of one man marrying multiple
women (i.e. polygyny).113 In many polygamous communities, wives’
roles are determined by theology and the structure of their families.114
Because of their position within the family, “[w]omen in polygamous
marriages are in an inherently vulnerable and unequal position in
social and economic terms, and are more likely to be victims of
domestic violence.”115 There are many reports of husbands abusing
their wives, and of wives abusing one another.116 At times, the animosity
between co-wives is palpable, even to external family members.117
Women in polygamous marriages may also witness the abuse of
their co-wives.118 Oftentimes, co-wives will not intervene to stop such

only form of polygamy that is widely practiced, and many of the concerns about
polygyny are based on the inherent inequality in a relationship where one man has
two or more wives. The recognition of the importance of monogamy and gender
equality, combined with the negative psychological and physical health effects on
women and children, help explain why there is a growing international trend to
prohibit or restrict polygamy.”). See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166
(1879) (“[P]olygamy leads to the patriarchal principle . . . which, when applied to large
communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot
long exist in connection with monogamy.”).
112
Bala, supra note 108, at 168. See also Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code
of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 13 (Can.) (stating that the patriarchal nature of
“[p]olygamy also institutionalized gender inequality”).
113
Al-Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo, supra note 7, at 745.
114
Bala, supra note 108, at 192 (quoting COMM. ON POLYGAMOUS ISSUES, LIFE IN
BOUNTIFUL: A REPORT IN THE LIFESTYLE OF A POLYGAMOUS CMTY. 12 (Apr. 1993)).
115
Id. at 210.
116
Id. (“Although some plural wives report harmonious, ‘sisterly’ relationships,
competition between wives (and sometimes their children) is an unfortunate reality in
many polygamous families, and it is not uncommon for a dominant wife to physically
abuse other wives.”).
117
The Canadian Case, Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, cited
the testimony of a child of a polygamous marriage, who noted that her relationship
with her father’s other wives was “[v]ery strange . . . with the two women who’d married
him before [her] mother, [and her relationship was] much like the relationship [her]
mother had with them.” She said, “[m]y mother was my dad’s favourite wife, and being
the favourite wife is a curse. You don’t want it. Because the other women are envious
of it and everybody is vying for it, and so you’re put down and torn down and ostracized
in a lot of ways. Some women, I’ll hear them talk about this great camaraderie they
have with their sister wives, and I say not true, because every day of your life is
competition for his resources, and they are limited and there’s not enough of him to
go around.” Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588,
para. 667 (Can.).
118
Dena Hassouneh-Phillips, Polygamy and Wife Abuse: A Qualitative Study of Muslim
Women in America, 22 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 735, 744 (2001).
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violence.119 Additionally, some wives perpetuate violence themselves.120
One of the most prominent and disturbing examples of violence in
polygamous marriages is the “Shafia family murders,” which occurred
in 2009. In a quadruple honor killing, the husband (Mohammad
Shafia), his second wife, and his son murdered Shafia’s first wife (who
was infertile) and his three daughters (believing them to be too
“Western”).121
Women in polygamous marriages are not only more susceptible
to physical harm; they are also more prone to emotional and
psychological harm.122 In a study comparing Bedouin Arab women in
monogamous marriages to Bedouin Arab women in polygamous
marriages, researchers Alean Al-Krenawi and John R. Graham found
that women in polygamous marriages “showed significantly more
psychological distress than their counterparts in monogamous
marriages.”123 Specifically, these women were more likely to report
higher levels of somatization, obsession-compulsion, depression,
interpersonal sensitivity, hostility, phobia, anxiety, paranoid ideation,
psychotism, and GSI-general symptom severity.124 The study’s findings
also evidenced a negative correlation between polygamy and life
satisfaction, as well as the quality of women’s marital and family lives.125
Though this study was not performed in the United States, and its
transferability is limited accordingly, it does show the comparative
effect of polygamous marriages on women.
B. Harm to Children
In addition to women, children are also harmed by polygamous
marriage. Polygamous marriages pose several risk factors, the most
significant being “family conflict, family distress, the absence of the

119

Id.
See id. at 745 (“In cases where emotional, physical, and/or sexual abuse was
ongoing, co-wives sometimes became combatants.”).
121
Melinda Dalton, Shafia Jury Finds All Guilty of 1st-degree Murder, CBC NEWS
MONTREAL (Jan. 29, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/shafia-juryfinds-all-guilty-of-1st-degree-murder-1.1150023.
122
See Bala, supra note 108, at 192–93 (referring to the findings of the Committee
on Polygamous Issues, saying that “the indoctrinated conformity and lack of personal
empowerment for women leads to an underdeveloped sense of self, an inability to
understand or exercise choice, and a blurring of personal and collective identity”).
123
Alean Al-Krenawi & John R. Graham, A Comparison of Family Functioning, Life and
Marital Satisfactions, and Mental Health of Women in Polygamous and Monogamous
Marriages, 52 INT’L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 5, 10 (2006).
124
Id.
125
Id.
120
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father, and financial stress.”126 Combined, these risk factors negatively
affect a child’s emotional and physical development and wellbeing.
Because plural marriage poses this threat, states have a compelling
interest in prohibiting plural marriage.
1. Familial Conflict and Distress
Marital conflict is often a defining characteristic of polygamous
marriages.127 Oftentimes such conflict manifests itself in physical or
emotional abuse. 128 Such abuse has been shown to negatively impact a
child’s physical, emotional, and social development.129 Even if children
are not directly harmed in the course of fights between their parents,
or between their parents and themselves, the fighting can still wreak
havoc on their developing bodies and psyches, causing permanent
damage.130
For example, children in abusive households are more likely to
exhibit signs of distress and anger, such as running away from their
home and being violent with others.131 They are also more likely to
internalize emotional issues, leading to increased levels of depression
and anxiety.132 In fact, feelings of depression may be so severe that the
child may feel as though there is no way out, precipitating suicidal and
homicidal thoughts.133 This cognitive experience has been termed the

126

Elbedour et al., supra note 107, at 258.
Id. (“Considerable research demonstrates that children of polygamous families
experience a higher incidence of martial conflict, family violence, and family
disruptions then do children of monogamous families.”).
128
Such physical and emotional abuse is also known as “spousal abuse.” See JAVAD
H. KASHANI & WESLEY D. ALLAN, THE IMPACT OF FAMILY VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS 33 (1998) (defining spousal abuse as “a behavior pattern,
characteristically inflicted on a female by a male, that occurs in physical, emotional,
and psychological forms”).
129
See, e.g., Abigail H. Gewirtz & Jeffrey L. Edleson, Young Children’s Exposure to
Intimate Partner Violence: Towards a Developmental Risk and Resilience Framework for Research
and Intervention, 22 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 151, 151 (2003) (“exposure to intimate partner
violence can variably affect a child’s development depending on other individual and
environmental influences”).
130
See Paul R. Amato & Juliana M. Sobolewski, The Effects of Divorce and Marital
Discord on Adult Children’s Psychological Well-Being, 66 AM. PSYCHOL. REV. 900 (2001)
(“Using 17-year longitudinal data from two generations, results show that divorce and
marital discord predict lower levels of psychological well-being in adulthood.”);
Elbedour et al., supra note 107, at 259 (internal citations omitted) (“The psychological
literature suggests that marital distress is linked with suppressed immune function,
cardiovascular arousal, and increases in stress-related hormones.”).
131
KASHANI & ALLAN, supra note 128, at 37.
132
Id. at 37–39.
133
Id. at 38–39.
127
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“lockage phenomenon.”134 Significantly, children in abusive homes are
also more likely to have issues with their social development.135 Marital
problems, specifically, have been shown to have dramatic, negative
effects on childhood development.136 Additionally, researchers have
shown that in those families where a child’s father abuses his or her
mother, the father is also more likely to abuse the child as well.137
Marital conflict also affects a child’s interactions with other family
members. For example, conflict between parents may lead to
displaced parental aggression; the parents may direct their frustration
and anger toward their children, who become “scapegoats.”138
Additionally, because of the level of conflict in plural marriage
households, older siblings may need to step into a parenting role for
their younger siblings, and also (sometimes) for their parents.139 Thus
role assumption can cause emotional issues for the older child later on
in the child’s life.140
Furthermore, polygamous marriages are often marked by periods
of intense disruption, due to the fluid nature of the marriage.141 Such
modification of the marital unit can negatively impact a “developing
child’s trust, security, and confidence.”142 Thus, since plural marriages
carry a high risk of both conflict and instability, they pose a danger to
children in them.

134

See id. (The “‘lockage phenomenon’. . . proposes that in conflicted or abusive
families, an adolescent may be under such intense and relentless pressure, either from
abuse or witnessing of abuse, that he or she can only see two possible means of escape:
suicide or homicide”).
135
Id. at 39–40.
136
See Elbedour et al., supra note 107, at 258–59 (internal citations omitted)
(“Development outcomes of children predicted by marital problems include the
following: poor social competence, a poorly developed sense of security, poor school
achievement, misconduct and aggression, and elevated heart rate reactivity. Marital
conflict is also likely to disrupt effective parenting and parental involvement. Further,
children who experience intense marital conflict tend to use aggressive behaviors as a
means of problem solving, show hostile patterns of interaction, and may be forced to
ally with one parent against the other.”).
137
KASHANI & ALLAN, supra note 128, at 35.
138
Elbedour et al., supra note 107, at 259.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
See id. at 258 (“It is likely then that the sudden shift from a monogamous to a
polygamous family system that occurs when a new spouse is added to the family would
constitute just the kind of a major challenge to a developing child’s sense of trust,
security, and confidence.”).
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2. The Absence of a Father
Sarah Hammon’s father, a member of the Fundamentalist Latter
Day Saints (FLDS) church, had nineteen wives and seventy-five
children; she, personally, was raised in a home with thirty siblings. Of
her relationship with her father she said:
I didn’t have a relationship with my dad. He didn’t know my
name or who my mother was or even that I was his child unless
I was in the house with him. And that was for 13 years that I
lived with him . . . . I felt very lost in the family. Like a number
more than . . . a valuable member of it.143
Since a father’s time is split between more children, the growing size
of polygamous families can pose significant problems. As the number
of children and wives increases, interfamilial bonds become
increasingly attenuated.144
The absence of a father figure negatively affects children in
polygamous marriages.145
Summarizing the available research,
Elbedour et al. concluded that “there are four key correlates of a
father’s absence that have the strongest effect on children: (a)
economic distress, which is associated with academic and psychosocial
maladjustment; (b) the child’s perception of abandonment by the
father; (c) social isolation; and (d) parental conflict.”146 These key
correlates have the potential to evoke lasting psychological and
physical harm.
3. Financial Stress
Polygamy is associated with high fertility rates, causing many
polygamous families to have economic needs beyond their means.147
The relatively large size of polygamous families affects children by
decreasing the amount of economic resources available to them,148
143

Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588, para.
667 (Can.) (citing Transcript at 67; 83-84 (8 December, 2010).
144
See Bala, supra note 108, at 198 (“Although children are surrounded by many
sibling role models, and may receive care from more than one maternal figure, they
receive less care and attention as more children are added to the family: both mother
and father become less available, and the bonds between parent and child weaken.”).
145
See Elbedour et al., supra note 107, at 259 (internal quotation omitted).
146
Id. (internal citations omitted).
147
Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588, para.
13 (Can.); see also Tamar Ezer et al., Divorce Reform: Rights Protections in the New
Swaziland, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 883, 898 n.89 (2007) (“People in polygamous
relationships tend to be very poor. The most vulnerable children come from
polygamous relationships.”) (quoting Interview with Phindile Weatherson, Bank
Personnel, in Ezulwini, Swaz. (Mar. 7, 2006)).
148
See Bala, supra note 108, at 198 (“[T]he more wives and children, the fewer
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leading “many polygamous families in the United States [to] receive
social assistance.”149 Significantly, this strain can impact children
mentally, as well as physically, by causing problems such as “depression,
antisocial behavior, and poor impulse control; poor academic
outcomes; and self-concept.”150 It can also negatively affect the way in
which a mother cares for her children, precipitating emotional
distress.151
In conclusion, marital conflict, marital distress, the absence of a
father, and financial stress affect a child’s mental and physical
wellbeing. This can start a “downward cycle of conflict,” since a child’s
wellbeing may increase tension between his or her parents.152 A 2008
study of polygamous marriage amongst Bedouin Arabs in Israel
exemplifies the problems associated with polygamous marriages and
the way in which it negatively impacts children. In this study, the
authors found that children in polygamous marriages were more likely
than children in monogamous marriages to suffer from psychiatric
illnesses and issues, “including somatization, obsessive compulsion,
depression, interpersonal sensitivity, hostility, phobic anxiety,
paranoid ideation, and psychosis.”153
Additionally, children in
polygamous marriages reported experiencing issues relating to their
peers, performing poorly in school, and having worse relationships
with their fathers.154
4. Effect on Adolescent Males
Polygamy also poses a threat to the wellbeing of adolescent males.
In many polygamous communities, and in FLDS communities in
particular, many adolescent and young men are effectively forced to
leave the community to ensure that the “chosen” men have multiple
wives.155 These young men are usually ill equipped to face life outside
of the confines of polygamous life. The main reason for this is that
these young men usually have inadequate educations and insufficiently

resources available for each family member.”).
149
Id.
150
See id. at 260 (internal citations omitted).
151
See Elbedour et al., supra note 107, at 259 (internal citation omitted) (“[T]he
mother’s distress has serious implication[s] for her children, because it can diminish
her level of caring, supervision, and involvement. Some distressed mothers can
become withdrawn, depressed, and even hostile towards their children.”).
152
Al-Krenawi & Graham, supra note 123, at 10.
153
Al- Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo, supra note 7, at 759.
154
Id.
155
Bala, supra note 108, at 192.
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developed life skills and social support.156
Additionally, an increase in unmarried men poses a threat to
society because unmarried men are “statistically predisposed to
violence and other anti-social behavior.”157 Since polygyny is the most
common form of polygamy, legalization of polygamy would likely lead
more men to take more wives, decreasing the pool of potential
brides.158 This could result in increased crime levels and a more
prevalent exhibition of antisocial behavior by the large number of
young, unmarried males.159
In his report, “Polygyny in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Theory and
Implications,” Dr. Joseph Heinrich found that unmarried men commit
crimes more often, and the crimes they commit are often much more
serious than the crimes committed by married men.160 Dr. Heinrich
also found that marriage could decrease a man’s probability of
criminal activity as much as thirty-five percent.161 Chief Justice Bauman
of the Supreme Court of British Columbia found this study to be
particularly compelling because of the breadth of the population
studied; the study that Dr. Heinrich relied upon tracked the criminal
activity of men ages seventeen to seventy.162 After conducting a crosscountry comparison, Dr. Heinrich also found that polygamy is widely
associated with higher levels of both murder and rape.163 Additionally,
he found that higher crime rates were generally associated with greater
numbers of unmarried males.164 This supports the belief that legalized
polygamy, by increasing the number of unwed young males, could lead
to higher crime rates.
C. The State’s “Compelling Interest”
The harms inherent in plural marriages were highlighted in the
landmark Canadian case, Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of
Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588 (Can.). Canada’s parliament prohibits
polygamy in Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada. This case
156

Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588, para.
11 (Can.).
157
Id. at para. 13.
158
Id. at para. 499 (regarding the conclusions of Dr. Joseph Henrich’s study,
“Polygyny in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Theory and Implications”).
159
Id.
160
Id. at para. 508.
161
Id. at para 509.
162
Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588, para.
509 (Can.).
163
Id. at para. 511.
164
Id. at para 509.
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was brought by British Columbia to determine whether the prohibition
of polygamy remained consistent with the Canadian Constitution, postlegalization of same-sex marriage. In his majority opinion, Chief
Justice Bauman concluded that “this case is essentially about harm . . . .
This includes harm to women, to children, to society and to the
institution of monogamous marriage.”165 He therefore held that the
prohibition of polygamy does not constitute an unconstitutional
prohibition.166 Because of the strength of the evidence attesting to the
harm caused by polygamous marriages, it seems likely that the United
States Supreme Court could find a similarly compelling interest.
Some supporters of polygamous marriages have analogized
polygamous marriage to same-sex marriage, arguing that both are
“equally legitimate.”167 However, polygamous marriage is a distinct
institution.168 Most prominently, the harm that polygamous marriage
causes to women and children is well documented and differentiates a
constitutional analysis of polygamous marriage from a similar analysis
of same-sex marriage.
In Obergefell, the third of the Court’s four reasons for recognizing
the right to marry someone of the same sex was that such recognition
would protect children and families.169 In contrast, the State may have
a compelling reason to prohibit polygamous marriage since there is
substantial evidence that polygamous marriages cause substantial
harm to women and children. Thus, Obergefell’s holding cannot be
automatically applied to polygamous marriage. For the purposes of
this Comment, it seems the most important exception to Obergefell’s
holding (if it is not found to be limited to couples) is the institution of
polygamous marriage itself.
D. Is the Prohibition of Polygamous Marriage “Narrowly Tailored”?
It seems that the State has a compelling interest in prohibiting
polygamous marriage.
Thus, the remaining question is the
165

Id. at para. 5.
Id. at para. 1361 (the law “is substantially constitutional and peripherally
problematic”).
167
Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for
Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1957 (2010).
168
See id. (“[W]hile the gay analogy may make for splashy punditry and good
television, it distracts us from what is truly distinctive, and legally meaningful, about
polygamy—namely, its challenges to the regulatory assumptions inherent in the twoperson marital model.”). Also, many American laws are tailored to the two-personal
marital model. Examples include tax law, health law, estate law, divorce law, and family
law. Recognition of polygamous marriage as a legal marital institution would require
substantial changes to such laws.
169
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
166
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relationship of the “ends” (protection of women and children from the
harms of polygamous marriage) to the “means” (the prohibition of
polygamous marriage). Under strict scrutiny, the State needs to show
that the prohibition of polygamous marriage is the only way to protect
women and children from the associated harms. Generally, domestic
violence laws, child support laws, child custody laws, and child
marriage laws protect women and children from some of the specific
harms associated with polygamous marriage. As a result, it might be
difficult to show that prohibition of polygamous marriage is the only
way to protect women and children from associated harms. Thus,
prohibition of polygamy may fail under the narrowly tailored prong of
the strict scrutiny test.
Even if the United States Supreme Court were to conclude that
anti-polygamy legislation is not narrowly tailored, it would not
automatically toll the death-knell for anti-polygamy legislation. Thus
far, the Court has declined to articulate a specific standard of review
for cases dealing with the fundamental right to marry.170 Instead of
applying strict scrutiny, the Court may apply rational-basis review as it
did in Turner v. Safley. Under rational basis review, the protection of
women and children need only be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.171 Because this is a much easier standard for the State to
satisfy, prohibition of polygamous marriage is more likely to be upheld.
The State clearly has a legitimate interest (the protection of women
and children from the harms of polygamous marriage), and the
prohibition of polygamous marriage is rationally related to
accomplishing that goal.
Thus, a determination of the
constitutionality of anti-polygamy legislation could depend on the
mode of judicial analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
There is a fundamental right to marry that has been repeatedly
recognized and reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court.172 If
the right to marry multiple people is seen as part of this fundamental
right, restrictions on polygamous marriage would probably be
subjected to heightened scrutiny. Strict scrutiny, though not wholly

170

See supra Part II.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The
general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
172
See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
171
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insulating,173 is a hard standard for the State to satisfy. Given the
presence of alternative options, under strict scrutiny restrictions on
polygamous marriage would probably be considered unconstitutional.
However, the Supreme Court has not yet held that strict scrutiny would
be required, and thus it is equally likely that rational basis review or
another deferential standard may apply. It would be relatively easy for
the Court to justify the prohibition of polygamous marriage under a
less scrutinizing standard, given the strength of the State’s compelling
interest in protecting women and children.
Despite the findings and conclusions made in this Comment,
which weigh against the legalization of polygamous marriage, there are
undoubtedly those who will argue in favor of polygamy’s
constitutionality, on other grounds.174 This Comment has viewed the
constitutionality of polygamy through the lens of substantive due
process. Thus, other constitutional arguments are beyond the breadth
of this Comment.
Post-Obergefell, the constitutionality of polygamous marriage is
unclear. Inclusion, or a lack thereof, of polygamous marriage in the
fundamental right to marry will largely determine whether or not
polygamous marriage is viewed as a fundamental right. Additionally,
even if polygamous marriage is held to be a fundamental right, we do
not yet know which standard of review the Supreme Court would
apply.175 Despite the particular form of judicial review, polygamous
marriage will still be haunted by the harm it can cause to women and
children. Evidence of such harm may be a major hurdle to a judiciallyrecognized right to marry multiple people. Perhaps even more
173

Strict scrutiny is not always fatal to the legislation at issue. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)) (“[W]e wish to dispel the notion
that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”).
174
For example, some plural marriage advocates have argued that polygamy is a
religious belief that is protected by the First Amendment. However, American courts
have repeatedly rejected this argument. Resultantly, there is a wide body of precedent
testifying to the fact that participants in polygamous marriage cannot use their religion
as a shield. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) (stating that
“the fact that polygamy is supported by a religious creed affords no defense in a
prospection for bigamy”); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 746 (Utah 2006) (holding that
“Utah’s prohibition on polygamous behavior does not run afoul of constitutional
guarantees protecting the free exercise of religion”); State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830
(Utah 2004) (reaffirming the Court’s holding in Reynolds and holding that “Utah’s
bigamy statute does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution”); State v. Fischer, 199 P.3d 663, 667 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2008) (“The United States Supreme Court has declined to extend the protection of
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the practice of polygamy.”).
175
The Court could choose to apply any standard of review in the spectrum, from
rational basis review to strict scrutiny.
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importantly, though Obergefell widened access to the fundamental right
to marry, entrance remains limited to two people at a time.

